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ADVOCATE IN RESIDENCE
THE DEATH PENALTY AS THE ANSWER TO
CRIME: COSTLY, COUNTERPRODUCTIVE
AND CORRUPTING
Stephen B. Bright*
I appreciate the opportunity to make some remarks
about capital punishment and about the crime debate in our
country today. Unfortunately, what is called a crime debate
is really no debate at all, but an unseemly competition among
politicians to show how tough they are on crime by support-
ing harsher penalties and less due process. The death pen-
alty and long prison sentences are being put forward as an
answer to the problem of violent crime. This approach is ex-
pensive and counterproductive. It is corrupting the courts
and diverting our efforts from the important problems of ra-
cial prejudice, poverty, violence and crime. It is not making
our streets any safer.
* This transcript originally appeared in volume 35, number 4. However,
numerous inadvertent errors appeared. We apologize to Stephen Bright on be-
half of the editors of volume 35. The corrected transcript appears here.
Stephen Bright has been director of the Southern Center for Human Rights
since 1982, and has represented persons facing the death penalty at trials, on
appeals, and in post-conviction proceedings since 1979. He has taught courses
on the death penalty at the law schools of Florida State, Harvard, and Yale
Universities, and has been a regular faculty member at the Bryan R.
Shechmesiter Death Penalty College, a week-long, intensive program for law-
yers involved in the trial of capital cases, which is held at Santa Clara Univer-
sity School of Law each August. He served on an American Bar Association
Committee that studied the capital punishment process and has testified on
capital punishment issues before committees of the U.S. Senate and House of
Representatives, as well as several state legislatures.
Stephen Bright was selected as the 1995 Distinguished Advocate in Resi-
dence at Santa Clara University School of Law. On February 16, 1995 he ad-
dressed the students, faculty, alumni, and members of the community about the
death penalty as the answer to crime. The following is a transcription of his
remarks.
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The power of government is increasingly being used to
wage class warfare top down against the poorest and the
most powerless people in our society: immigrants, women
and children who are on welfare, and those who are accused
of crimes. These people have no lobby and no ability to influ-
ence legislation or the decisionmakers in government. They
have no political action committee. Unlike Rupert Murdock,
they cannot drop by and meet with the Speaker of the U.S.
House of Representatives while he is contemplating a book
deal. Their only protection against the passions of the mo-
ment is the Bill of Rights.
The Bill of Rights is becoming a casualty of the war on
the poor. There has been very little discussion of the conse-
quences to our society. The United States Congress, in the
first one hundred days after the Republican takeover with the
"Contract with America," behaved much like the legislatures
in Georgia or Alabama, where bills are often passed without
hearings, without a great deal of opposition, without much
debate, and without the members being informed about what
they are voting on.
In the discussion of crime measures, the Bill of Rights is
dismissed as nothing more than a collection
of "technicalities" which burden law enforcement. The war
against drugs has all but eliminated the Fourth Amend-
ment's protection from unreasonable searches and seizures
from the Constitution. Police departments and law enforce-
ment agencies all across the country have become corrupted,
but we have very little to show for this effort in terms of hav-
ing reduced the amount of drug use in this society. Now,
those who profess to be our leaders are talking about a
broader war, the war on crime, that will be waged at a much
greater cost.
I. DEMAGOGUERY ON CRIME IN AMERICAN POLITICS
Before the Cold War, politicians would accuse each other
of being "soft on Communism." In some parts of the country,
a politician could not be "soft on Communism" - whatever
that meant - and remain in office. But now that Commu-
nism has collapsed, the new code word in politics is crime.
One cannot be soft on crime. Crime, like Communism, is
something that everyone is against. But the overly simplistic
litmus tests for determining whether a public official is "soft"
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do not always result in the most thoughtful or best ap-
proaches to preventing crime in our society.
Crime began to emerge as a potent weapon of political
demagoguery with Richard Nixon's acceptance speech to the
1968 Republican Convention. He promised that if he was
elected President of the United States, we would have a new
Attorney General. Ramsey Clark, the Attorney General, was
blamed for crime.
Lee Atwater later urged Republicans running for office to
stress the crime issue because many Democrats were opposed
to capital punishment. George Bush's campaign may have
established the low water mark in 1988 with his advertise-
ments featuring Willie Horton, who committed a rape while
on furlough from a prison in Massachusetts.
Not nearly as noticed, but equally as sad, was the sched-
uling of the execution of a brain damaged man by the Gover-
nor of Arkansas and Presidential candidate Bill Clinton right
before the New Hampshire primary in 1992.1 Clinton flew
back to Arkansas to make a show of denying clemency for
Ricky Ray Rector, an African-American sentenced to death by
an all-white jury for the murder of a white police officer. Af-
ter shooting the officer, Rector had put the gun up to his own
head and shot out the front part of his brain.
By the time of his execution, Rector had grown to some
300 pounds. In the days before his execution, Rector barked
at the moon, laughed inappropriately, and said he was going
to vote for Clinton for President. Rector had the habit of sav-
ing his dessert after dinner every night and eating it later.
Bill Clinton came back to Arkansas, and with much fanfare
presided over the execution of Ricky Rector. It was discov-
ered later that night that Ricky Rector had put aside his pe-
can pie. He had so little appreciation of what death meant
that he thought he was going to come back that evening after
the execution and finish off his dessert.
The politicizing of the death penalty has been seen in
political campaigns in Texas, where four years ago the attor-
ney general and the governor argued about who was most re-
sponsible for the executions that had taken place. The big-
gest applause lines for the new Governor of New York,
George Pataki, and the new attorney general were their
1. The execution of Ricky Rector and Bill Clinton's role in it are described
in Marshall Frady, Death in Arkansas, NEW YORKER, Feb. 22, 1993, at 105.
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promises to reinstate the death penalty in New York and
send a prisoner, Thomas Grasso, to Oklahoma where he could
be executed.2 What possible effect on the lives of New
Yorkers was it going to have to take this man, Thomas
Grasso, and send him back to Oklahoma, so Oklahoma could
put him to death? And yet, it seemed to be the most impor-
tant thing the new governor and attorney general could do for
New York.
With the demands for death from every quarter has come
a much greater acceptance of the death penalty in this coun-
try than would have seemed possible several years ago. In
1987, the case of McCleskey v. Kemp3 was argued before the
United States Supreme Court. From the argument, it ap-
peared that the Court might do something about the rank ra-
cial disparities in imposition of the death penalty. Unfortu-
nately, however, by a five-to-four vote, the Court, in
McCleskey, allowed Georgia to continue to carry out the death
penalty despite those racial disparities. In an opinion by Jus-
tice Lewis Powell, the Court held that it did not matter that a
person who is accused of the murder of a white person is four
times more likely to get the death penalty than someone ac-
cused of the murder of an African-American.'
We now know from Thurgood Marshall's papers that Jus-
tice Scalia was convinced by the evidence that race played a
role in the imposition of the death penalty in Georgia.5 Nev-
ertheless, he ultimately voted to affirm anyway. Justice Pow-
ell, now retired from the Court, told his biographer that the
vote he regrets the most on the Supreme Court was that key
fifth vote affirming McCleskey.6
The same day that McCleskey v. Kemp was argued at the
Supreme Court, the Senate voted on a crime bill that con-
tained death penalty provisions. There were not enough
votes in the Senate in 1987 to close debate and enact a federal
death penalty. But the next year, 1988, was an election year
2. John Kifner, A Distant State Watches a Killer Waiting to Die, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 19, 1995, at A37.
3. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
4. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 279.
5. David C. Baldus, Symposium: The Capital Jury Project, Keynote Ad-
dress: The Death Penalty Dialogue Between Law and Social Science, 70 IND.
L.J. 1033, 1040 (1995).
6. JOHN C. JEFFREYS, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY 451
(1994).
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and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act passed with one death penalty
provision in it, the so-called "drug king pin" provision. But
the death penalty was limited to homicide cases committed
by "drug king pins" where major drug transactions were
involved.
By 1994, there seemed to be no limit on death. The Dem-
ocrats took back the crime issue with Clinton's execution of
Ricky Rector before the New Hampshire primary, and took
back the White House the following November. The only
competition between the two political parties on the issue of
crime was to see which could be tougher than the other. The
death penalty was provided for over fifty federal offenses in
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994,7 signed into law by President Clinton in September.
Nevertheless, many Republicans opposed the law and com-
plained that the bill was not tough enough.
And now, those who authored the "Contract with
America" and took control of Congress in January of 1995
have promised even more use of the death penalty and that
they will cut back on what little federal habeas corpus review
remains. One bill would make it easier to impose the death
penalty in federal cases by not disclosing to the jury the alter-
native sentence. Although the once great Writ of Habeas
Corpus has been virtually destroyed by procedural barriers
imposed by the Supreme Court under the leadership of Wil-
ham Rehnquist in the last fifteen years,8 the Republicans
7. Pub. L. 103-322, 105 Stat. 1976 (1994).
8. The Court has limited the availability of the writ to vindicate constitu-
tional rights by adopting strict rules of procedural default, see, e.g., Smith v.
Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533-36 (1986); Engle v. Isaacs, 456 U.S. 107, 130-34
(1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 88-91 (1977); Timothy J. Foley, The
New Arbitrariness: Procedural Default of Federal Habeas Claims in Capital
Cases, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 193 (1989); by excluding most Fourth Amendment
claims from habeas corpus review, see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); by
requiring deference to fact finding by state court judges, see, e.g., Patton v.
Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981), after re-
mand, 455 U.S. 591 (1982), after second remand, 464 U.S. 957 (1983); by mak-
ing it more difficult for petitioners to obtain an evidentiary hearing to prove a
constitutional violation, see Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992); by
adopting an extremely restrictive doctrine regarding the retroactivity of consti-
tutional law, see Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); James S. Liebman, More
than "Slightly Retro": The Rehnquist Court's Rout of Habeas Corpus Jurisdic-
tion in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 537 (1991); by reduc-
ing the harmless error standard for constitutional violations recognized in fed-
eral habeas review, see Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993); and by
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want to do more to limit the ability of the federal courts to
correct constitutional violations. The Senate has passed a
bill that would prevent federal courts from granting relief in
habeas corpus cases unless the state court's legal conclusions
were "arbitrary and unreasonable."9
Part of the war on crime is to be tough on the prisoners of
that war. The U.S. House of Representatives has passed a
bill which, like so many proposals that are part of the "Con-
tract with America," has an Orwellian title to disguise its
true purpose. It is called the "Stop Turning Out Prisoners
Act." This bill would strip the federal courts of much of their
ability to remedy unconstitutional conditions in prisons and
jails. The discussion of the proposal was typical of the very
uninformed debates that occur today with regard to crime.
Some spoke of prisoners claiming in lawsuits that their ice
cream had melted and other frivolous matters. No one talked
about the people in prisons and jails who have been sexually
assaulted, killed, or disfigured for life because of conditions in
America's overcrowded prisons and jails.
Two weeks ago, I was at a county jail in McDuffie
County, Georgia, which had capacity for thirty-seven prison-
ers, but was housing over 100. People were sleeping on the
floors and sleeping where toilets were overflowing into where
they slept.
I recall being in one such jail with a very conservative
federal judge, whose only qualification for the federal bench
had been that he had given a lot of money to a Senator's cam-
paign. He had shown his hostility to prisoners in numerous
previous cases. But after he toured the jail, he told the head
of the county commission, "you wouldn't spend one hour in
this place and you have people living here twenty-four hours
a day." The Chairman of the County Commission responded
that it was just too expensive to put the people in other jails
restricting when a constitutional violation may be raised in a second habeas
petition, see McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
9. The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995, S. 735, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), passed by the Senate, requires deference by federal
courts to decisions of state courts unless the decision is "contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law," id. § 604(3),
establishes a statute of limitation for the filing of habeas corpus petitions, id.
§ 601, further restricts when a federal court may conduct an evidentiary hear-
ing, id. § 604(4), and adds new barriers to hearing a successive habeas corpus
petition, id. § 605. See David Cole, Destruction of the Habeas Safety Net, LEGAL
TIMES, June 19, 1995, at 30.
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in nearby counties. The judge replied, "That's why we have
federal courts."
If Congress removes even the little power that federal
courts have to correct grossly inhumane conditions of confine-
ment, there will be no place for those languishing in such
places to turn. The county commissions and the state legisla-
tures are not going to worry about overcrowding in prisons
and jails, inadequate staffing of those institutions, lack of
medical care for prisoners or other deficiencies. They will not
worry about violence until the violence becomes riots and
guards are injured. The only protection that inmates have
from the indifference of those in power is the protection of the
Bill of Rights and the federal courts.
Politicians at the state level are equally anxious to
demonstrate that they are not "soft on crime," no matter what
the economic or social cost. "Three strikes, you're out" was a
good sound bite, so it has become the crime policy of a
number of states at enormous cost in prison space and con-
gestion in the courts. Georgia - always on the cutting edge
in these matters - recently passed a constitutional amend-
ment providing for "two strikes and you're out," life imprison-
ment after two violent felonies. Governor Pete Wilson of Cal-
ifornia was at one time proposing "one strike and you're out."
Fortunately, these people were not around when baseball was
being developed or there would be some very short evenings
at Candlestick Park.
II. THE DARK SIDE OF THE AMERICAN SPIRIT
Thurgood Marshall once said that the measure of a coun-
try's greatness is its ability to retain its compassion in times
of crisis. Under that test, we are not measuring up. We are
not showing compassion for the poor, for immigrants, or for
the disadvantaged in our society.
The cheering that accompanies executions is a troubling
indication of our lack of compassion. Celebrations occurred
after the execution of my client James David Raulerson at the
Florida State Penitentiary in 1985. He was sentenced to
death for the murder of a police officer in Jacksonville.
Within moments of his being pronounced dead, some of the
police officers in the witness room slapped the father of the
victim on the back and congratulated him and pumped his
hand as if someone had just scored a touchdown. When I
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walked out of the prison there was a group of police officers
selling T-shirts that had on them a picture of the electric
chair and the words, "Crank Up Old Sparky." There was a
big celebration going on and I stopped to observe it. While I
was standing there, the hearse with my client in it drove by
on the way to the funeral home. A cheer went up from the
crowd.
When executions are carried out in Huntsville, Texas,
the fraternities turn out and have beer parties. In Virginia,
after one of my clients had been executed, I left the prison
and saw the fraternities partying. Signs were displayed say-
ing "turning up the juice" and "give him more." In Georgia,
some of the bars have beer parties when someone is executed.
The celebrations of death are only one example of how
the death penalty brings out the dark side of the American
spirit. We do not see our society at its best when we are cele-
brating the death of any individual, regardless of who the
person is or what he or she may have done. Some people ar-
gue that we are too civilized in this country for capital pun-
ishment. But, based on what I see, I have serious doubts of
whether we are civilized enough.
The Milwaukee County District Attorney, E. Michael Mc-
Cann, who prosecuted Jeffrey Dahmer for a series of grue-
some murders in 1991, made some very unusual and very im-
pressive remarks after Dahmer was stabbed to death in 1994
in a Wisconsin prison. McCann observed that Dahmer's par-
ents "will have to experience the same loss the families of his
victims have experienced." 10 He found this widening of the
circle of violence and suffering - what he called "the last sad
chapter in a very sad life . . . tragic."'1 Mr. McCann recog-
nized something that many Americans seem not to realize,
that even the death of Jeffrey Dahmer was not something to
celebrate.
But instead of calling upon us to reflect, most prosecutors
and other public officials exploit the victims of crime and the
death penalty for political gain by stirring up and pandering
to fears of crime. The policies that are resulting from this
approach are costing our society a tremendous price in
money, in the corruption of the judiciary, and in diverting
10. Don Terry, Jeffrey Dahmer, Multiple Killer, Is Bludgeoned to Death in
Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1994, at Al.
11. Id.
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millions of dollars from education, drug programs, commu-
nity policing and other measures that would actually help
prevent crime.
III. COURTS THAT FOLLOW THE ELECTION RETURNS, NOT
THE LAW
California provides a classic example of what such em-
phasis on the death penalty can do to the courts. Governor
George Deukmejian, after he had already come out against
the retention of Chief Justice Rose Bird on the California
Supreme Court, threatened that if two other members of the
court did not change their votes in capital cases, he would
campaign against their retention as well. To their credit,
they did not change their votes. The governor carried out his
threat and in 1986, three justices were voted off the court.
Governor Deukmejian appointed their replacements, who
have given the voters what they wanted. The California
Supreme Court, which had been one of the most distin-
guished state supreme courts in the country, is now an un-
distinguished death mill known only for its various refine-
ments of the harmless error doctrine. 12
This example has been followed in Mississippi, Texas
and other states where judges have been voted off the bench
upon accusation that they were "soft on crime" and replaced
with judges who would give the voters what they want. 13
Judges are not like legislators. Their responsibility is
not to follow the election returns, but to follow the law. But
justices and judges are unlikely to follow the law in high pro-
file capital cases when by doing so they are signing their own
political death warrants. As justices and judges are voted off
the bench in California and other states, the fairness and in-
12. See Elliot C. Kessler, Death and Harmlessness: Application of the
Harmless Error Rule by the Bird and Lucas Courts in Death Penalty Cases - A
Comparison & Critique, 26 U.S.F. L. REv. 41, 85, 89 (1991) (observing that the
new court has "reversed every premise of the Bird Court's harmless error analy-
sis," displaying an eagerness to find error harmless that reflects "jurispruden-
tial theory" less than a "desire to carry out the death penalty").
13. Stephen B. Bright and Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of
Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital
Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 760-765, 784-792 (1995).
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tegrity of the judicial system is becoming a casualty of the
war on crime.
14
IV. THE FAILURE TO ENFORCE THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
One of the most egregious and consistent failures of the
judiciary to enforce the law has been with regard to the Sixth
Amendment's right to counsel."5 There are at least three peo-
ple condemned to die in Texas who were represented by
court-appointed lawyers who slept at times during the trials
at which their clients were sentenced to death. In one case, a
judge in Houston said, "the Constitution guarantees you a
right to counsel, but the Constitution does not say that the
lawyer has to be awake."16 If one of these people is executed,
it will not be anything out of the ordinary - it probably will
not even make the news - because Texas executes so many
people now that it has become routine.
Equally shocking examples of deficient representation
can be found in other states where the death penalty is im-
posed. Jack House was sentenced to death in a Georgia trial
in which his lawyer was parking his car while one of the
state's witnesses testified on direct; yet he cross-examined
the witness whose direct testimony he had never heard.
1 7
Judy Haney was represented at her capital trial in Alabama
by a lawyer who came to court so drunk one morning during
the trial that the judge had to send the jury out and had to
send the lawyer to jail for the day. The next morning, the
judge produced both the lawyer and the client from jail and
resumed the capital trial, and the death penalty was
imposed."1
14. For further discussion of the impact of the crime debate on the judiciary
in states where judges are elected, see id. at 792-833.
15. For a more comprehensive discussion of the problems of deficient repre-
sentation in capital cases, and the reasons for it, see Stephen B. Bright, Counsel
for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Law-
yer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994).
16. John Makeig, Asleep on the Job: Slaying Trial Boring, Lawyer Said,
Hous. CHRON., Aug. 14, 1992, at A35. See also Paul M. Barrett, On the Defense,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 1994, at Al (describing lawyer Joe Frank Cannon, who is
appointed to criminal cases in Houston and was alleged to fall asleep during
death penalty trials; ten of his clients have been sentenced to death).
17. House v. Balkcom, 725 F.2d 608, 612 (llth Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
870 (1984).
18. Record at 846-49, State v. Haney, 603 So. 2d 368 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991),
aff'd, 603 So. 2d 412 (Ala. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 925 (1993).
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Billy Birt was represented, over his objection, in a trial in
Georgia. Birt knew that the lawyer did not care about him
and asked for a new lawyer. But the trial judge, reasoning
that he was paying the lawyer, and not Birt, refused to dis-
charge the lawyer. The lawyer did not object to the inten-
tional underrepresentation of African-Americans in the jury
pools in the county. When evidence of the exclusion of Afri-
can-Americans from jury pools was presented in federal re-
view of the case, the federal court refused to review the rul-
ing, finding the issue had been waived because the lawyer
had not preserved it. 19
This lawyer was later asked to name all the criminal law
opinions from any court with which he was familiar. He
thought about it for a minute and he said, "well, there's the
Miranda decision. Everybody knows the Miranda decision.
And there's the Dred Scott decision."20 Those were the only
two criminal cases he could name. It was no wonder he had
not raised a challenge to the underrepresentation of African-
Americans in the jury pools. He was not aware of the
Supreme Court decisions that held such discrimination to be
a violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution. And yet, elected trial judges in
Georgia have appointed that lawyer to case after case, to de-
fend people accused of crimes and to defend people facing the
death penalty.
I became involved in capital punishment work in 1979
after volunteering to handle a case pro bono and receiving the
record of a death penalty case in Georgia that was about one
and a half inches thick. I will never forget calling the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union in Georgia and saying "surely this
is not the record, an inch and one half thick, in a death pen-
alty case. It couldn't be." At the time, I was supervising law
students in a law school clinic. We produced larger records
than that in shoplifting cases.
I read the record that night. It was remarkable. The
lawyer did almost nothing. He gave a quick opening state-
19. Birt v. Montgomery, 725 F.2d 587 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 874
(1984)
20. Transcript of Hearing of Apr. 25-27, 1988, at 231, State v. Birt (Sup. Ct.
Jefferson County, Ga.) (No. 2360). The lawyer referred to Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). Dred Scott
was not a criminal case.
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ment. He did not cross examine much. He did not put on any
evidence. The next day, I mentioned to a colleague at the
clinic that our students tried shoplifting cases better than
this death penalty case had been tried.
I did not realize that, by the standards that are accepted
in capital cases, the lawyer had done a good job in that case.
At least he did not use a racial slur to refer to his client. I
have since seen five cases in which defendants were referred
to with a racial slur by their own court-appointed lawyers,
the lawyers who supposedly were defending them. The law-
yer in that first case I saw did not fall out of his chair at any
time during the trial as did the lawyer who supposedly de-
fended Charlie Young at Young's capital trial in Georgia.
The lawyer in that first case knew that a capital trial is
bifurcated into two trials, one on guilt and one for sentencing,
although he did almost nothing at either phase. Since then, I
have seen several cases where the lawyer was not aware that
capital trials are bifurcated. In a recent capital case in Ala-
bama, the defense lawyer asked the judge for a few minutes
before the penalty phase so that he could read the death pen-
alty statute.
A short time after taking that first case, I went to Geor-
gia to meet the client. He was an eighteen-year-old African-
American suffering from schizophrenia who was totally out of
touch with reality. The jury that had sentenced him to death
had not been told that he was schizophrenic. If fact, the jury
knew nothing about him.
I found it troubling that one could be sentenced to death
in such a perfunctory process, and with such deficient legal
representation. How could the jury possibly decide whether a
person should live or die if it had no information about the
person? I agreed to take some other cases. The more I saw,
the more amazed I was at what is allowed to go on in the
courts of this land in capital cases.
For example, the only time George Dungee's lawyer ever
said anything about his client in the whole trial was when he
said to the jury in closing argument, "what we've got here,
ladies and gentlemen, is a little 138-pound nigger man that
probably doesn't have an I.Q. over eighty."21 If the lawyer
21. Transcript of Opening and Closing Arguments at 39, State v. Dungee,
Record Excerpts at 102 (11th Cir.) (No. 85-8202), decided sub non. Isaacs v.
Kemp, 778 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164 (1986).
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had done any investigation, he would have found that George
Dungee's I.Q. in fact was sixty-five, that he could not make
change, and he could not drive a car. But none of that was
presented to the jury. His lawyer just took a guess at his I.Q.
during closing argument.
This type of representation does not occur just in Ala-
bama, Georgia, and Texas. In one California case, the de-
fense lawyer was stopped on the way to court and it was
found that his blood alcohol level was so high that he could
not operate a motor vehicle. The California Supreme Court
concluded that it did not mean he rendered ineffective assist-
ance of counsel.2 2
A study by the Philadelphia Inquirer disclosed the poor
level of representation in capital cases in Philadelphia.23 The
Inquirer looked at twenty cases where the death penalty had
been imposed and found that in only eight had there been any
investigator for the defense. And in only two had funds been
authorized for expert witnesses - psychologists costing $400
in one case and $500 in the other. People who worked in the
court system in Philadelphia were quoted as saying that they
would not want to be represented in traffic court by the law-
yers appointed to death penalty cases.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently
reversed a finding of ineffective representation in a Penn-
sylvania case where the defense lawyer tailored his presenta-
tion of evidence and argument around a death penalty stat-
ute that had been declared unconstitutional three years
earlier because it limited the arguments on which the defense
could rely as to mitigating circumstances.2 4 Is it requiring
too much of lawyers to expect them to figure out what statute
their client is being tried under?
The promise of Gideon v. Wainwright25 remains unful-
filled over thirty years after that case was decided. Clarence
Earl Gideon was convicted of a felony at a trial in which he
was not represented by counsel. He filed his own petition to
22. People v. Garrison, 765 P.2d 419 (Cal. 1989).
23. Fredric N. Tulsky, What Price Justice? Poor Defendants Pay the Cost as
Courts Save on Murder Trials, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 13, 1992, at Al; Fredric
N. Tulsky, Big-Time Trials, Small Time Defenses, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 14,
1992, at Al.
24. Frey v. Fulcomer, 974 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 954
(1993).
25. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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the United States Supreme Court seeking the right to coun-
sel. The Supreme Court held that there was a right to coun-
sel in felony cases and remanded the case to the Florida
courts for trial with counsel. Gideon was acquitted at his
retrial.
In his marvelous book about the case, Gideon's Trum-
pet,26 Antony Lewis wrote that bringing to life the holding of
the Gideon decision - providing every person charged with a
crime a capable defense lawyer - would be an enormous
challenge. Unfortunately, many jurisdictions have resisted
the holding of Gideon instead of accepting the challenge.
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is viewed as an
unfunded federal mandate which the states are free to ignore.
The result is deficient representation, and the result of defi-
cient representation is that courts and juries do not get infor-
mation that they need to decide guilt or innocence or the
proper punishment. In addition, as a result of poor represen-
tation by lawyers who do not know the law, the fundamental
guarantees of the Bill of Rights are often ignored in capital
trials.
Gary Nelson spent eleven years on death row in Georgia,
convicted on the basis of a crime laboratory expert who testi-
fied that a hair found on the victim's body had come from
Gary Nelson. Nelson was represented by a lawyer who was
paid $20 an hour and provided no money for an investigator
or an expert. After Nelson had spent years on death row
awaiting electrocution, it was discovered that the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation had examined the hair and concluded
that because it was a chest hair, it did not have sufficient
characteristics for microscopic comparison.2 7 If Gary Nel-
son's lawyer had consulted with anyone who knew anything
about hair comparison, if he had been provided funds for his
own independent expert, Gary Nelson would not have spent
eleven years on death row.
It is not unusual for a death sentence to be imposed upon
a mentally retarded or mentally ill person by a jury that
knows nothing about the mental impairments of the accused.
Death sentences imposed after such trials have recently been
carried out in Alabama, Louisiana, and Texas. In each of
these cases, and countless others, the jury was unable to per-
26. ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1964).
27. Nelson v. Zant, 405 S.E.2d 250, 252 (Ga. 1991).
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form its constitutional obligation of making a fair and reliable
determination of guilt, or a reasoned moral decision with re-
gard to punishment because of the deficient representation
provided the accused.
Inadequate representation may also leave those most in
need of the protections of the Bill of Rights without any pro-
tection at all. An example is John Eldon Smith, the first per-
son executed in Georgia. He was one of three people involved
in two murders in Macon, Georgia. Smith had the misfortune
of being represented by lawyers who were not aware of U.S.
Supreme Court decisions holding that the exclusion of women
from juries violates the Constitution, and his lawyers did not
challenge the exclusion of women practiced in that county at
the time of Smith's trial. The lawyers for one of Smith's co-
defendants did know the law. The issue was raised, although
it was rejected by the Georgia courts. The third defendant in
the case exchanged testimony against the other two for a
lighter sentence. The two defendants who went to trial were
sentenced to death.28
Several years later when the cases made their way to
federal court and were reviewed by judges who were serving
life tenure - not judges who had to face the Georgia electo-
rate every few years as superior court judges in Georgia do -
it was a simple application of the law to the facts. A new trial
was ordered in the co-defendant's case. 29 When the co-de-
fendant was tried before a jury that fairly represented the
community, a life sentence was imposed.30
But John Eldon Smith did not get a new trial before a
jury that fairly represented the community, even though the
jury that sentenced him to death had been drawn from the
same unconstitutional jury pool as was the jury for his co-
defendant. The federal court of appeals held that because
Smith's lawyers did not raise the issue before trial, it had
been waived. 31 Smith was executed. If Smith had been rep-
resented by the lawyers who represented his co-defendant, he
would be alive today. By the same token, if his lawyers had
28. Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1003
(1983).
29. Machetti v. Linahan, 679 F.2d 236 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1127 (1983).
30. Smith, 715 F.2d at 1476.
31. Id. at 1469-72.
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represented the co-defendant, they would have waived the is-
sue in that case and the co-defendant would be dead today.
Fifteen years ago, many people would have considered it
unthinkable to execute someone who was sentenced to death
in violation of the Bill of Rights. Today, it routinely happens
in case after case. Although the death penalty was upheld by
the Supreme Court in 1976, based in part on the promise that
state supreme courts would search the record for constitu-
tional error whether it had been raised or not, today courts
search through the records not to find error, but to find a pro-
cedural basis on which to avoid the vindication of constitu-
tional rights.
One of the significant moral issues related to the death
penalty is whether it is fair and morally right to give a poor
person accused of a crime a bad lawyer - a lawyer who does
not care about the client, a lawyer who may be insensitive to
the client's race, poverty or mental limitations, a lawyer who
receives so little compensation that it is impossible to devote
the time required to prepare the case, a lawyer who is not
provided with the expert witnesses or the investigative
assistance necessary to prepare for trial and mount a defense
- and then, attribute all of the failings of the lawyer to the
client, who had no voice in his selection or may have even
objected to the lawyer. Billy Birt said he did not want the
lawyer assigned to him, but it was Billy Birt, not the lawyer,
who paid for the lawyer's ignorance of the law when the fed-
eral courts refused to correct the constitutional violation.
John Eldon Smith paid with his life for his lawyer's ignorance
of the law.
V. THE TOLERANCE OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
Wiley Dobbs was sentenced to death in Walker County,
Georgia, a community south of Chattanooga, Tennessee.
Dobbs was tried by a judge who had been a segregationist in
the legislature and called Dobbs by his first name. The judge
called him "boy" and "colored" during the trial as did the pros-
ecutor.2 Dobbs had a hapless court-appointed lawyer. Ques-
tioned in post-conviction proceedings about his racial atti-
tudes, the lawyer expressed his belief that African-Americans
32. Dobbs v. Zant, 720 F. Supp. 1566, 1570 (N.D. Ga. 1989), aff'd, 946 F.2d
1519 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd on other grounds and remanded, 506 U.S. 357
(1993).
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make good basketball players but not good teachers, that
when you hire an African-American you do so with the knowl-
edge that they will steal, and that he used the term "nigger"
jokingly. 3
At the penalty phase of Wiley Dobbs' trial, the lawyer put
on no evidence about his life or his background. He told the
jury nothing about the man whose life was in their hands.
For a closing argument at the penalty phase, he read part of
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in the case of Furman
v. Georgia,4 the 1972 case that declared the death penalty
unconstitutional. The jury had a man's life in its hands. To
read an opinion that says the death penalty is unconstitu-
tional and will not be carried out is not much of a trial strat-
egy, particularly in Walker County, Georgia, where most peo-
ple strongly favor the death penalty.
A federal district court held that the lawyer's racism did
not matter because the lawyer did not sentence Dobbs and
there was no showing that the lawyer's racism affected his
performance as counsel.3 5 This case shows how indifferent
courts are to racial discrimination.
The criminal justice system is the part of our society that
has been the least affected by America's civil rights move-
ment. As I go around the South - particularly in the states
where I practice, Mississippi, Alabama and Georgia primar-
ily, which have substantial African-American populations -
I see the diversity of the population reflected in those working
at the hospitals, at the schools, and at many other institu-
tions. Things are still not where they should be, particularly
the schools, but some change has been made in the last thirty
years. But at the courthouses around the South, nothing has
changed. One still sees white judges and white prosecutors
and white defense lawyers and, amazingly, all-white juries,
even in communities that often have thirty to forty percent
African-American populations.
It is absurd to think that a lawyer's racism has no effect
on his performance. A lawyer's duty at the penalty phase of a
capital trial is to tell the jury everything about the life and
background of the client. The responsibility of the lawyer is
33. Id.
34. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
35. Dobbs v. Zant, No. 4:80-CV-247-HLM (N.D. Ga. 1994) (Order of July 29,
1994).
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to walk a mile in the shoes of the client, to see who he is, to
get to know his family and the people who care about him,
and then to present that information to the jury in a way that
can be taken into account in deciding whether the client is so
beyond redemption that he should be eliminated from the
human community. That job cannot be done by a lawyer
whose racial prejudice causes him to believe that his client is
inferior or subhuman or would only make a good basketball
player.
The case of Wiley Dobbs shows again the extent to which
the courts have denigrated the right to counsel. Anyone with
a fifth grade education can show up and listen to the other
side's evidence and read a portion of Justice Brennan's con-
curring opinion in Furman. A twelve-year-old child can do
that. We now have federal case law that says that is good
enough for the defense of a capital case.
Courts tolerate racial discrimination in capital cases and
in the criminal justice system that would not be tolerated in
any other area of American life. Albert Jefferson, a mentally
retarded African-American was sentenced to death by an all-
white jury in Chambers County, Alabama. At the time of Jef-
ferson's trial, the marriage licenses were kept in books en-
graved with the words "white" and "colored" in the clerk's of-
fice. The prosecution had used twenty-six jury strikes
against twenty-six African-Americans in Jefferson's case. As
a result, not a single member of Jefferson's race served on the
juries that found him mentally competent for trial, guilty of
murder and sentenced him to death.
The use of twenty-six jury strikes against twenty-six Af-
rican-Americans is a very damning statistic. Either there
was racial discrimination or it was an amazing coincidence
that the prosecutor found all twenty-si-: African-Americans
but not a single white worthy of a peremptory jury strike.
But lists of the prospective jurors which were found in the
prosecutor's file revealed even more about the purpose behind
those strikes.
The prosecutor had divided prospective jurors up into
four lists, apparently in accordance with his perception of
whether they would be desirable jurors for the State. One list
was marked "strong," another was marked "medium," an-
other was marked "weak," and one list was marked "black."
The last list contained the names of all of the African-Ameri-
1086 [Vol. 36
ADVOCATE IN RESIDENCE
can jurors. And, of course, those on the "black" list were the
people he struck. Yet, the locally elected judge held that
there was no racial discrimination in the exercise of those
twenty-six strikes. 6
It is remarkable what one finds in courthouses. A Geor-
gia lawyer once found a page from a yellow legal pad with a
bunch of numbers scribbled on it in the clerk's office in Put-
nam County. He did not know what it meant. He asked the
clerk, who did not know any better than to tell him that it
was a memorandum from the district attorney to the jury
commissioners telling them how many black people to put in
the jury pools. In the memorandum, the district attorney had
instructed the commissioners to underrepresent the black
people by just enough to avoid a prima facie case under court
precedents.3 7 One wonders how many such lists and memo-
randa are never found.
Ed Peters, the district attorney in Jackson, Mississippi,
publicly said in the newspaper and later under oath in a dep-
osition that it is his policy in exercising his discretionary jury
strikes to "get rid of" as many black people as possible. 8
That is how a government official selects a jury. In the case
of Leo Edwards, an African-American, Peters obtained an all-
white jury in accordance with this practice. Neither the state
nor federal courts found this to violate the Constitution, and
Leo Edwards was executed.39
What other government official or entity - such as a
school, a housing authority, or an employer - would be al-
lowed to divide applicants into four categories of strong, me-
dium, weak and black, and then eliminate all of one group
based upon race? It was permitted in a death penalty case.
It is equally difficult to imagine that a public official in any
other area of life could have a policy of "getting rid of" people
based upon their race upheld by the courts.
36. State v. Jefferson, No. CC-88-77 (Cir. Ct. Chambers County, Ala., 1992)
(Order of Oct. 2, 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 645 So. 2d 313 (Ala. Crim. App.
1994).
37. Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988) (ordering that Amadeo be given
habeas corpus relief because of the intentional racial discrimination directed by
the prosecutor). Both the Georgia Supreme Court and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied Amadeo relief despite the prosecu-
tor's intentional, race-based rigging of the jury.
38. Edwards v. Scroggy, 849 F.2d 204, 207 (5th Cir. 1988).
39. Id.
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Georgia has executed eighteen people; twelve were Afri-
can-Americans. Seven of the ten executed in Alabama were
African-American. In Mississippi, three out of the four exe-
cuted have been black. Although black people are the victims
of sixty-five percent of the murders in the South, eighty-five
percent of those sentenced to death are there for murders in-
volving white victims.
The federal government has been even worse than the
states in failing to prevent racial discrimination in the inflic-
tion of the death penalty. Under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988, the federal government has prosecuted thirty-seven
death penalty cases. All but four have been against racial mi-
norities. The first ten capital prosecutions approved by Attor-
ney General Janet Reno were against African-Americans.4 °
Ten for ten. Even in Alabama we do not see this kind of ra-
cial disparity.
Yet despite the pronounced racial disparities docu-
mented by many observers 4 both state and federal courts
have been completely unwilling to deal with the influence of
racial prejudice on the imposition of the death sentence.
Courts avoid even mentioning the issue whenever possible
and, while professing their commitment to eliminating the in-
fluence of racial prejudice on the process, deny relief by set-
ting unreasonable burdens of proof, impossible legal stan-
dards, and wholly inadequate remedies.4 2
VI. THE RISK OF ERROR IN DETERMINING GUILT OR
PUNISHMENT
There are limits on what can reasonably be expected of
courts. The judicial system provides a way of resolving dis-
putes. Resolving disputes in court is better than fighting du-
els, but the courts are not infallible. There have been more
than a few capital cases which illustrate the possibility of er-
ror in making the decision of guilt or innocence, a decision
40. Racial Bias, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 28, 1994, at A9.
41. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RE-
SEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 5 (1990) (reporting that an
analysis of 28 studies found a "remarkably consistent" pattern of racial dispari-
ties in capital sentencing throughout the country).
42. For further discussion of the failure of the courts to deal with racial
discrimination in the infliction of the death penalty, see Stephen B. Bright, Dis-
crimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial Discrimination in In-
fliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433 (1995).
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which is a far easier to make than whether a human being
should live or die.
Kurt Bloodsworth was released after eight years from
prison in Maryland where he had been sentenced first to
death, and then to life imprisonment for murder and sexual
assault of a child. He was released only because of the new
developments in the science of DNA identification which al-
lowed experts to analyze a tiny semen stain found on the
panties of the victim and determine it was not left by Mr.
Bloodsworth.43 Clearly, someone else had committed the
crime.
Walter McMillian spent six years on death row in Ala-
bama for a murder committed in Monroe County, Alabama,
where Harper Lee wrote To Kill A Mocking Bird. He was re-
leased after it was shown that he was at a fish fry in another
county at the time the crime took place."
Fred Martinez-Macias, in Texas, was represented at trial
by a court-appointed lawyer who was paid $11.84 an hour.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit made the ob-
servation, which could be made in a lot of capital cases, that
the criminal justice system got what it paid for.45 The court
set the conviction aside. When the case was put before a
grand jury in El Paso, it did not even indict Martinez-Macias.
He is a free man today.
Another person sentenced to death in Texas, Randall
Dale Adams, was the defendant whose story was told in the
motion picture The Thin Blue Line. Adams was found inno-
cent and released from death row only because the prosecu-
tion turned over its files to some film makers who demon-
strated his innocence. Clarence Brantley's innocence was
shown, as was Walter McMillian's, by the CBS television pro-
gram, Sixty Minutes. Brantley, McMillian, and Adams are
free today not because of the legal system, but because of me-
dia attention.
That these innocent people were nearly executed should
make us hesitate with regard to whether the death penalty
should be used. Yet, the debate today is over how to speed up
43. Paul W. Valentine, Jailed for Murder, Freed by DNA, WASH. POST, June
29, 1993, at Al.
44. Peter Applebome, Alabama Releases Man Held on Death Row for Six
Years, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1993, at Al.
45. Martinez-Macias v. Collins, 979 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1992).
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the process, how to cut back on appeals, and how to have
more executions.
And the tone of the debate has changed. The idea of exe-
cuting innocent people was once unthinkable. But as it be-
came increasingly clear that the system never has been and
still is not capable of preventing execution of the innocent, it
was argued that there is a war on crime and in any war, there
are always some innocent casualties. That is a troubling
argument.
But even more troubling is the argument made by a for-
mer prosecutor who acknowledged that innocent persons may
be convicted as a result of "human frailty" or "prejudice, igno-
rance, neglect and occasional actual malice," but nevertheless
asserted that "many persons who are wrongfully convicted
may deserve serious punishment for many uncharged crimes
that cannot be prosecuted for one reason or another."4"
Think about that. In the crime debate in America today, it is
argued that it is acceptable to carry on executions because
there are throw away people in our society who are guilty of
something.
The Supreme Court of the United States almost allowed
an execution to occur in the case of Schiup v. Delo,4v in which
there was a serious question about innocence based on a
video tape showing that Schlup could not have committed the
crime because he was somewhere else at the time it occurred.
Four members of the United States Supreme Court thought it
was more important to avoid confusion and prevent repetitive
litigation than it was to correct that kind of injustice. Fortu-
nately, five members of the Court voted the other way.
As difficult as the decision of guilt or innocence may be in
some cases, capital cases call upon jurors and judges to make
an even larger and more difficult decision in determining
punishment. Whether someone should be eliminated from
the human community is unlike the issues normally
presented to juries at civil and criminal trials - factual ques-
tions involving a brief span of time such as who ran the red
light, who was negligent, or who fired the shot. Those factual
questions may be very difficult and complex, particularly in a
46. Howard R. Birnbach, Reasons for Reinstating the Death Penalty, N.Y.
L.J., Dec. 28, 1994, at 2. Birnbach is a former assistant district attorney in the
Bronx.
47. 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995).
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homicide case where there is only circumstantial evidence as
to who may have committed the crime.
But those questions pale in comparison to the far more
complex, disturbing, and unanswerable moral question of
whether to condemn a fellow human being to death. The an-
swer to that question requires consideration not of a few min-
utes or days, but of the entire life and being of an individual.
Yet juries, upon returning from the often exhausting and
emotionally draining task of reaching a verdict on guilt, must
take on the even greater question of life or death. It has
proven to be an unmanageable undertaking. The courts have
failed completely in providing consistent results when the in-
quiry is made.
Often the decisions about guilt and punishment are not
made in the calm and dispassionate setting that is appropri-
ate for such a grave and important decision. Capital cases
are often tried in the midst of the passions of the moment.
Interracial crimes usually produce more news coverage and
more community outrage. The community is upset and peo-
ple are calling for blood. Often, the prosecutor is exploiting
the case for political gain. The state's case may rest on the
testimony of suspects in the same or other crimes who have
every reason to lie or embellish their stories in order to get
better treatment for themselves. The defendant may receive
only token representation from a lawyer who would prefer to
be doing anything else. Even though the stakes are the high-
est and the need for a fair, reliable, and objective determina-
tion is the greatest, this is not when the legal system func-
tions the best.
In the war on crime, our courts and our society are be-
coming increasingly indifferent to death and to injustice.
Jesse Jacobs was executed in Texas after being sentenced to
death at a trial in which the prosecutor asserted that Jacobs
had fired the fatal shot that killed the victim. However, after
obtaining a conviction and the death penalty, the prosecutor
changed theories and asserted that Jacobs' sister killed the
victim. The prosecutor even called Jacobs to testify against
the sister. The prosecution renounced the theory under
which it obtained the death penalty for Jacobs, and then used
this testimony to convict his sister. But the State success-
fully argued that Jacobs should still be executed, even though
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under Texas law if the killing was not deliberate he would not
be eligible for the death penalty. 68
This indifference to death, to inadequate counsel, to ra-
cism, to the possibility of error, and to other injustices is an
enormous price for society to pay for capital punishment.49
And society is getting nothing in return. If all of the men,
women and children on death row in this country - over
3000 - were executed tomorrow, the streets in Atlanta, Los
Angeles, San Francisco, and Dallas would not be any safer
than they are tonight. The problems of racism, poverty, lack
of education, and lack of opportunity would still be there.
And so long as those problems remain, there will be crime in
America.
VII. THE ABSENCE OF LEADERSHIP
At a time when there is a need to be concerned about the
fairness and integrity of the judicial system and the survival
of the Bill of Rights, there is a remarkable lack of leadership
in the land and a lack of meaningful debate about the impor-
tance of the integrity of the court system.
It was not always this way. When Gideon v. Wain-
wright5' was before the U.S. Supreme Court, the attorney
generals of Minnesota, Massachusetts and twenty-two other
states filed an amicus curiae brief in support of Clarence Earl
Gideon, the indigent person seeking counsel. They recog-
nized that the adversary system did not work when one side
was deprived of counsel.
When he was Attorney General, Robert Kennedy secured
passage of the Criminal Justice Act to provide representation
to poor people accused of crimes in the federal courts. Today,
however, the associations of state attorneys general and dis-
trict attorneys and the U.S. Department of Justice oppose
even the most token efforts to improve the quality of counsel
in capital cases.
48. Jacobs v. Scott, 115 S. Ct. 711 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
49. Various studies have also concluded that the death penalty is carried
out at enormous financial cost as well. The most recent study by professors at
the Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy at Duke Unversity found that it
costs $163,000 more for North Carolina to impose the death penalty on a case
than to incarcerate a defendant for 20 years. PHILLIP J. COOK & DONNA B.
SLAWSON, THE COSTS OF PROCESSING MURDER CASES IN NORTH CAROLINA (1993).
50. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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A rare bit of leadership was provided recently by the dis-
trict attorney of Manhattan, Robert M. Morgenthau, who
wrote an article in the New York Times in which he urged
New York not to adopt the death penalty. His plea, as one
who had spent a career in law enforcement, was that enact-
ing a death penalty statute would be a grave mistake. He
revealed the secret that prosecutors often share only among
themselves - that the death penalty actually hinders the
fight against crime. He wrote:
Promoted by members of both parties in response to an
angry populace, capital punishment is a mirage that de-
tracts society from more fruitful, less facile answers. It
exacts a terrible price in dollars, lives and human de-
cency. Rather than tamping down the flames of violence,
it fuels them while draining millions of dollars from more
promising efforts to restore safety to our lives.51
Morgenthau pointed out that when he became the district at-
torney of Manhattan, the rate of homicides was twice what it
is in Manhattan today. It had declined without the death
penalty.
What is so troubling is how seldom this secret is re-
vealed. I hear the same thing from judges and district attor-
neys who agree - in private - that the death penalty does
not work, that it is racist, that the quality of the legal repre-
sentation is a disgrace, and that the system is not accom-
plishing anything. Yet, in public, they are unwilling to admit
that the emperor wears no clothes. The consequences of go-
ing against the prevailing winds may be too great. But such
silence is not appropriate. It is a failure of leadership by
those who have been trusted with positions of authority.
Instead of a discussion of the difficult and complex
problems that confront our society, the political leadership in
Washington has found some very odd scapegoats for
America's ills. I know many of those who are scapegoats -
people who are homeless, people who are poor, people who
are accused of crimes. Yet I do not know of one homeless per-
son who is responsible for the failure of a savings and loan. I
do not know a single child or mother on welfare who has
moved a plant to Mexico.
51. Robert M. Morgenthau, What Prosecutors Won't Tell You, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 7, 1995, at All.
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I have represented people who committed some heinous
crimes; there is no question about that. But the harm that
they did, great and tragic and indefensible as it has been, has
not been as great as some of the harm done to millions of peo-
ple by those who have dumped hazardous waste, those re-
sponsible for pollution, and those who have failed to provide
safe working conditions for their employees.
There is a great deal of talk in Congress today about
state's rights, about returning power to the state. Those of us
in the South know about state's rights. We know what it
means. In Georgia, the Confederate battle flag was adopted
as the state flag in defiance of Brown v. Board of Education.52
The state flag stands for defiance of the United States
Supreme Court and the proposition that black children are
entitled to the same kind of education as white children. The
Confederate battle flag - this symbol of defiance of the fed-
eral government and equal protection of the law - is dis-
played today in Georgia's courtrooms. It is a symbol of state's
rights. We also know Strom Thurmond. Strom Thurmond
ran for president as a Dixiecrat in 1948 - for state's rights,
for segregation, for keeping people in "their place."53 So when
Strom Thurmond talks about state's rights, we know what he
is talking about. Strom Thurmond has not changed; the rest
of the country is changing to become more like the South.
But there is much unfinished business in America that will
never be accomplished without the involvement of the federal
government.
No one in leadership in this country today is asking the
great political and moral question of our time: are we going
to provide the same helping hand to the children of America
that we provided to the Chrysler Corporation, to the savings
and loans that failed, and to Mexico to protect American in-
vestments there?
The question is not being asked, but it is being answered.
The answer from Speaker Newt Gingrich and so many others
is the same answer Ebenezer Scrooge gave in Charles Dick-
52. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that racial segregation in public schools
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Brown v.
Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (requiring the desegregation of public
schools to proceed "with all deliberate speed").
53. NADINE COHODAS, IN DIXIELAND, HE TOOK His STAND, STROM THUR-
MAND AND THE POLITICS OF SOUTHERN CHANGE (1994).
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ens' classic, A Christmas Carol: "Are there no prisons, are
there no workhouses, are there no orphanages?"
VIII. THE CHALLENGE PRESENTED BY THIS INDIFFERENCE
What are you going to do about it? I want to encourage
law students and lawyers to use your talents to help those
who most need it - people facing the death penalty, immi-
grants, people who are poor, people of color and those who are
on welfare. It is going to be increasingly difficult to protect
the rights of those people, but that is what makes it even
more important for you to respond to these needs. If nothing
else, we can bear witness to the injustices these people suffer
and call our fellow Americans out of their indifference.
The death penalty is gaining popularity and momentum.
More states are adopting the death penalty and more execu-
tions are being carried out. The federal government will soon
join the grisly business of killing people. Although I have no
doubt that the United States will someday join the rest of the
industrialized world in abandoning capital punishment, that
day is not in the near future. But, like those who worked on
the underground railroad before the abolition of slavery, we
can use our energy and talents to provide safe passage to peo-
ple one at a time. You can provide the care, the competence,
the dedication and the hard work that is so often missing in
the representation provided those facing the death penalty.
Unlike the death belt states of the South where there are
no public defender programs, there are many outstanding
public defender offices here in California. Young lawyers can
go to those offices and provide good representation to poor
people accused of crimes. There is a tremendous need for
people to come to the South and provide representation.
Why did you go to law school? Many go to law school to
represent the poor and the powerless, to fight for civil and
human rights, and to make the world a better place. But, un-
fortunately, by the time of graduation many law students lose
their way due to the temptation of money, power and prestige
that is so easily available to one who has a law degree or per-
haps just the temptation to take the path of least resistance.
Reverend John Flynn has observed, "The choice you
must make is which suffering to avoid; the suffering that love
demands and that brings peace, or the suffering that comes
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from emptiness."54 A life in the legal profession can provide
great material wealth, but also a great deal of emptiness if
one remains silent and remains indifferent.
I leave you with the challenge issued by Justice
Thurgood Marshall, six months before he died, in accepting
the Liberty Bell Award in Philadelphia. Justice Marshall
was frail. He was in a wheelchair. But by the end of his re-
marks, it was observed that "his voice was as booming as [it
had been] in those magnificent times when he argued before
the Supreme Court."5 5 Justice Marshall said:
I wish I could say that racism and prejudice are only dis-
tant memories... and that liberty and equality were just
around the bend. I wish I could say that America has
come to appreciate diversity and to see and accept similar-
ity. But as I look around, I see not a nation of unity but of
division - Afro and white, indigenous and immigrant,
rich and poor, educated and illiterate ....
Look around. Can't you not see the tensions in
Watts? Can't you feel the fear in Scarsdale? Can't you
sense the alienation in Simi Valley? The despair in the
South Bronx? The rage in Brooklyn?
We cannot play ostrich. Democracy cannot flourish
among fear. Liberty cannot bloom among hate. Justice
cannot take root amid rage. We must go against the pre-
vailing wind. We must dissent from the indifference. We
must dissent from the apathy.... We must dissent from a
government that has left its young without jobs, education
or hope. We must dissent from the poverty of vision and
an absence of leadership. We must dissent because
America can do better, because America has no choice but
to do better. Take a chance, won't you? Knock down the
fences that divide. Tear apart the walls that imprison.
Reach out; freedom lies just on the other side.56
54. Diary of an Urban Priest, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1994, § 13, at 1.
55. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Justice Clarence Thomas in Retrospect, 45
HASTINGS L.J. 1405, 1430 (1994).
56. CARL T. RowAN, DREAM MAKERS, DREAM BREAKERS; THE WORLD OF JUS-
TICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 453-54 (1993).
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